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1Sensitivity Analysis
on Service-Driven Network Planning
Paolo Di Francesco Member, IEEE, Jacek Kibiłda Member, IEEE, Francesco Malandrino, Member, IEEE,
Nicholas Kaminski, Member, IEEE, Luiz A. DaSilva, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Service providers are expected to play an increasingly central role in the mobile market and their relationship with the
traditional mobile network operators (MNOs) is starting to change. The dilemma faced by over-the-top service-providers (OTT) is now
whether to enter into a service level agreement with the MNOs (in the same spirit of mobile virtual network operator agreements) or to
invest in deploying their own network infrastructure to serve their demand. The purpose of this paper is to study the factors shaping the
agreements between OTTs and MNOs and how these factors impact network planning decisions. To this end, we build a synthetic
model of cellular network deployment that explores how traditional mobile operators and OTTs compete in deploying new infrastructure.
Using our model in conjunction with real-world data, we find that service-driven networks are heavily influenced by regulatory
decisions, and that cost structures and demand characteristics play non-marginal roles in the definition of service-driven networks.
Index Terms—Network Planning, SLA, Sensitivity Analysis, Optimization.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
THE mobile market is rapidly changing and becomingmore complex. Nowadays mobile network operators’
(MNOs) ability to generate revenue relies, firstly, on their
subscribers and, secondly, on wholesale agreements with
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in a second-
tier market [1]. Unfortunately this revenue model does not
seem sustainable as the growing demand for capacity and
data-rates forces MNOs to heavily invest in costly network
infrastructure expansions and upgrades, impacting the prof-
itability of running a mobile network. As a result, MNOs are
showing interest in different business models [2].
Meanwhile, many over-the-top service providers (OTTs)
have based their success on the users’ perception of limitless
traffic [3] and Internet’s ubiquitous access. Mobile capacity
shortages, and subsequent service degradation, would affect
OTTs’ ability to generate profit. In particular, the OTTs
offering bandwidth-intensive services such as HD video
streaming on-demand or online gaming, which require strict
quality of service (QoS), are the most exposed. Essentially,
these OTTs are presented with two (non-exclusive) strate-
gies: (i) to acquire capacity on-demand from MNOs, and (ii)
to deploy their own infrastructure. Indeed we are already
starting to witness similar scenarios. For example, Google’s
Project Fi [4] offers to its subscribers both Wi-Fi, as part
of Google’s effort to deploy its own infrastructure, and
LTE connection, as part of Google’s MVNO agreement with
traditional MNOs (i.e., Sprint and T-Mobile in the US). Other
examples also exist and include the FreeBasics initiative by
Facebook [5] and the Twitter deals [6].
A third strategy exists and aims at acting on the traffic
demand. In its simplest form, certain types of traffic are
charged at higher rates or downright forbidden. We leave
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these issues out of the scope of our work, as (i) they are
seldom seen in real-world mobile networks, with the partial
exception of MNOs blocking peer-to-peer traffic, and (ii)
they would conflict with the right here, right now spirit
driving users and providers of mobile services.
In our model, OTTs can decide to enter into service level
agreements (SLAs) with an MNO to get a certain QoS for
their services. In exchange for a fee, the MNO will reserve
enough capacity to satisfy the QoS expected. The OTTs
would need to decide whether it is more cost effective to
rely on SLAs with selected MNOs or to deploy their own
network infrastructure. The MNOs, in turn, would factor
SLAs with OTTs into their decision of whether and how to
expand their networks. In other words, we will enter the
age of service-driven network expansion, and, more forward-
looking, service-driven networks.
In order to study service-driven network expansion we
need to assess, first, which factors are likely to influence
SLAs, and second, the characteristics of the resulting net-
works. The former are presented on the left hand side
of Fig. 1 and include technical and non-technical aspects.
Factors considered include the technologies available (e.g.
LTE, WiFi) and their costs, public policy and regulation
(e.g., whether to release new bands to the public, spectrum
licensing schemes), and the characteristics of the demand.
The resulting network characteristics are presented on the
right hand side of Fig. 1 and include, for example, the level
of heterogeneity of the resulting network in terms of both
ownership and technology, the use of licensed/unlicensed
spectrum, and the emergence of virtual networks tailored to
OTTs. The likely result is a move from the current paradigm,
where networks are designed, owned and controlled by
MNOs, to a new one, where OTTs have a major role in
the deployment of new infrastructure. Infrastructure will
tend to become more heterogeneous, and integrate differ-
ent equipment, some of which will operate on unlicensed
spectrum (e.g., ISM bands, as in LAA-LTE [7]).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate, qualitatively
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Fig. 1: The features of service-driven networks (blue boxes
on the right hand side), and the factors driving them (yellow
boxes on the left hand side) map into parameters and
decision variables of our system model, respectively. Our
high-level goal is to study the relationship between all those
quantities, i.e., to untangle the network of arrows between
the blocks.
and quantitatively, the impact of the different factors, listed
on the left-hand side of Fig. 1, on the SLAs between an
MNO and OTTs and on the planning decisions for service-
driven networks. The first contribution of this work is
a synthetic model of a cellular network deployment that
accounts for some of the most relevant aspects of the service-
driven network deployment described in Fig. 1 and how
they interact with each other. For example, the set of tech-
nologies available to OTTs in our model will depend on
regulatory decisions, e.g., whether OTTs will be allowed to
use licensed spectrum. Model parameters will account for
the extent to which different parts of the spectrum can be
considered equivalent to each other (e.g., intuitively, how
many megahertz of Wi-Fi spectrum are needed to obtain the
same performance of one megahertz of LTE spectrum), a
concept often called fungibility [8]. Our model captures the
decisions made by OTTs about whether and how to deploy
their own infrastructure; as an example, we have a decision
variable expressing whether each operator deploys a base
station of a certain type at a certain location, and parameters
expressing the cost of doing so.
After presenting our model in Sec. 2, we detail in Sec. 3
our solution concept, showing how the main actors involved
in the network expansion process efficiently make self-
interested, near-optimal decisions. Sec. 4 contains estimates
for all the factors we account for. Results, obtained for the
real-world topology described in Sec. 5 and summarized
in Sec. 6, show the impact of these factors on how and by
whom service-driven networks will be built and operated.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present our systemmodel, summarized in
Fig. 2. We consider a snapshot of the network, taken during
high-load conditions that are typically [9, Sec. 10.3.3.2] used
as a reference when planning a network. The purpose of our
model is to capture the network conditions in a challenging
situation (as detailed in Sec. 4 and Sec. 5), so its infras-
tructure can be planned accordingly. In this study, we also
assume that backhaul is not a limiting factor for network
capacity.
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t ∈ T l ∈ Lt u ∈ U c ∈ C
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Fig. 2: Our system model. Grey, vertical blocks represent the
model entities. Horizontal blocks correspond to parameters
(green blocks) and decision variables (blue ones). Horizon-
tal and vertical blocks cross when the parameter/variable
represented by the horizontal block is indexed by the entity
represented by the vertical one, e.g., a deployment decision
is made for each technology and base station. Yellow clouds,
corresponding to the boxes on the left hand side of Fig. 1,
indicate the sources of our parameters.
The level of abstraction of our model is one of the most
critical decisions we have to make. Cellular networks are
highly complex entities, and any model trying to capture all
this complexity would be exceedingly difficult to handle. As
such, we employ simplifiedmodels to estimate, for example,
the capacity for the different technologies, or the candidate
locations of new base stations. However, it is important
to stress that our goal is not to propose a comprehensive
model for cellular network operations, but rather to study
the relationships shown in Fig. 1 that influence network
planning decisions of service-driven networks.
Another important decision deals with the level of de-
terminism of our model. Three options were possible:
1) a fully probabilistic model, where we need to know
the distribution for all quantities, and are able to
estimate the distribution of the objective function
and the probability that each constraint be met;
2) a hybrid model, where quantities are known as
distributions, but constraints need to be met with
a static target probability;
3) a fully deterministic model, where parameters are
known as fixed, worst-case values.
We opt for the third possibility, for simplicity and ef-
ficiency considerations but most importantly because we
are dealing with network planning decisions, which can
take years to implement and whose effects can last for
decades. These decisions are usually made based on long-
term, worst-case projections and forecasts.
In other words, every time we mention, for example,
“the user traffic”, we actually refer to the worst-case user
traffic that can be realistically expected. It follows that the
deployments resulting from our model are remarkably re-
silient to demand and propagation conditions. It also means
that they might be slightly more costly, for OTTs and MNOs,
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than they could, but this is consistent with the fact that no
network provider is willing to risk service disruptions to
their users [10].
System elements
Our system model includes four elements, represented by
grey vertical blocks in Fig. 2: technologies, locations, user
clusters and content types. The sets of technologies, loca-
tions, clusters and content types are, within our system
model, input data. In Sec. 4 and Sec. 5 we will discuss how
and where this information is gathered.
Technologies t ∈ T represent the available types of net-
work infrastructure. LTE macro and micro base stations
as well as WiFi and mmWave access points correspond
to different technologies; furthermore, base stations using
different frequencies or power levels also correspond to
different technologies. In general, if two infrastructure el-
ements have different cost or coverage or performance, then
in our model they correspond to different technologies.
Some technologies require specific permissions or a license
to operate (e.g. LTE base stations in licensed bands) and
they are unlikely to be deployed by the OTTs. Therefore,
we denote as TOTT ⊆ T the set of technologies available to
the OTTs, while TMNO ≡ T corresponds to the technologies
available to the MNOs.
Locations l ∈ Lt represent the positions in space at
which infrastructure of technology t ∈ T may be located.
As an example, each building within an urban area may
correspond to a location. In the following, we will often refer
to the combination of a location l ∈ Lt and a base station
type t ∈ T as a base station.
User clusters u ∈ U represent groups of users that can
be seen as co-located. Indeed, when performing network
planning, we are not interested in the position or mobility
of individual users, but rather in the total number of users
in a constrained geographic area.
Last, Content types c ∈ C (hereinafter “contents”) repre-
sent the types of content users are interested in accessing
such as HD video or on-line gaming.
Parameters
Parameters are known quantities associated with one or
more elements of our system model. They are represented
by green horizontal blocks in Fig. 2. From the viewpoint of
our model, they are input values; however, as denoted by
the yellow clouds in the figure, they actually come from the
sources listed in Sec. 4.
The first parameter is the estimated capacity k(l, t, u) that
a base station of technology t ∈ T , built in location l ∈ Lt,
would be able to offer to users in cluster u ∈ U if it serves
no other clusters, and it is based on a simplified model as
expressed in:
k(l, t, u) = f(t)B(t)η(l, t, u), ∀t ∈ T , l ∈ Lt, u ∈ U , (1)
where f(t) indicates the performance penalty incurred in
when using unlicensed frequencies (see Sec. 4.2), B(t) is
the bandwidth available to technology t (see Sec. 4.1), and
η(l, t, u) is the spectral efficiency that a base station of
technology t in location l can deliver to user cluster u. The
spectral efficiency is estimated using the Shannon bound
and accounts for the distance between a location and a user
cluster, the propagation model, and the specific technology
employed. The maximum spectral efficiency achievable is
also limited by the technology considered (see Sec. 4.1) as
expressed in Eq. (2):
η(l, t, u) ≤ ηmax(t), ∀t ∈ T , l ∈ Lt, u ∈ U . (2)
Notice that η-values can also account for site-specific
information, if available – as an example, a site with a
commanding view on top of a hill will have a higher
efficiency than a tower on a flat ground surrounded by trees.
Moreover, η-values also account for interference. Specifi-
cally, interference from legacy, pre-existing deployments is
embedded in the initial η-values, similarly to other site-
specific information. Interference from new deployments,
i.e., new base stations deployed by OTTs and MNOs, can be
accounted for in a similar way, at the cost of recomputing
the η-values, as discussed in Sec. 3.
We also need to know the cost p(l, t) of building a base
station of technology t ∈ T in location l ∈ Lt. Cost ranges
for different technologies can be extracted from the litera-
ture, as detailed in Sec. 4. If such information is available,
costs can also incorporate rent and maintenance, and site-
specific features like existing rights-of-way to honor.
Costs p are per-year: they include recurring expenses
(e.g., rent and energy) and the amortization of one-time
costs, e.g., equipment. This allows our model to describe
both green-field scenarios, where networks are built from
scratch, and scenarios where network evolves from one gen-
eration to the next. In the latter case, existing infrastructure
is taken into account by lowering the cost of those (l, t)
combinations for which there is a base station of type t
already deployed at location l.1
Last, we have the demand τ(c, u) requested by users in
cluster u ∈ U for content type c ∈ C. As discussed in Sec. 1,
in our model the demand is a given parameter: MNOs and
OTTs alike have no way of influencing it, neither through
price incentives nor through traffic shaping techniques. As
the authors of [11] put it, our users are impatient.
Variables
Variables correspond to the decisions MNOs or OTTs make.
They are represented by blue horizontal boxes in Fig. 2.
The first task the MNO faces is to propose an SLA fee
to the OTTs, where the OTTs has to pay for their contents
to be given a guaranteed bitrate. Such a fee may be a direct
payment or some other form of revenue transfer from OTTs
to the MNOs [?], [6]. In our model, we represent it through
a per-megabit fee β charged to the OTT to have its traffic
served by the MNO’s network.
The following decisions concern whether or not the OTTs
deploy a base station of technology t ∈ T at location l ∈ Lt
represented through a binary variable yOTT(l, t). Parallel
decisions are how to serve the users, i.e., the fraction of
the total time and frequency resources (in LTE terminology,
physical resource blocks, PRBs) a base station of technol-
ogy t ∈ T , deployed at location l ∈ Lt, uses to meet the
1. Though not necessarily setting them to zero, as existing base
stations may still be subject to recurring costs.
3
demand of a subscriber requesting content c ∈ C located
in cluster u ∈ U . This is expressed through a real-valued
variable xOTT(c, l, t, u) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, the MNO has to
deploy its own infrastructure and decide how to serve the
residual demand for all the contents. These decisions can be
represented by yMNO(l, t) and xMNO(c, l, t, u), respectively.
yMNO and xMNO indicate the same type of decision variables
as yOTT and xOTT, but they refer to the MNO rather than the
OTT.
3 SOLUTION CONCEPT
Our model accounts for the two main actors involved in
deploying and managing service-driven networks, i.e., tra-
ditional MNOs and OTTs. Each actor is self-interested and
ultimately aims at maximizing its own profit. In this section,
we detail the decision process they take part in, and how
individual decisions are made.
3.1 Decision process
In our model, both OTTs and the MNO seek to maximize
their profit (or, equivalently, minimize their costs, as revenue
obtained from end users is assumed constant). Both need to
decide what infrastructure of their own to deploy, in which
location, and of what type. OTTs also need to decide how
much to rely on the MNO to serve their content types, and
the MNO needs to decide how much to charge OTTs to
satisfy QoS requirements specified in the SLA for the OTTs’
contents.
In the first stage, the MNO decides the fee, i.e., the per-
megabit price that OTTs have to pay if they want their
contents to be delivered at a certain bitrate. Fees have an
effect on the revenue the MNO collects. Intuitively, setting
low fees indicates potentially low revenue for the MNO,
which has to serve more traffic (hence update its network)
for little additional revenue. On the other hand, setting very
high fees represents a stronger incentive for OTTs to deploy
their own infrastructure, rather than paying the MNO for
their content to be delivered.
In the second stage, OTTs have to plan their infrastruc-
ture. For each part of the topology, they can choose between
having the MNO serve their demand therein – and paying
the fee – or serving the demand themselves, deploying their
own base stations – and bearing the related cost.
In the third stage, MNOs have to make decisions regard-
ing deployment in their network. They know they have to
serve all the demand left unserved by the OTTs in order
to honor their commitments, by deploying the necessary
infrastructure while minimizing their costs.
Note that, at every stage of the solution, we assume
that the demand will be served, i.e., that the dimensioning
problem is feasible. This assumption reflects the widespread
belief that it will be possible for cellular networks to cope
with the challenge posed by the increase in data demand,
and we seek the best way to do so.
3.2 Individual steps
In the following, we detail how the MNOs and the OTTs
make their decisions in each step of the process described
in Fig. 4, and specifically, the problem they seek to optimize
and the method they employ to do it. We start by presenting
the deployment decisions for each OTT, then the subsequent
deployment decisions for the MNO. We reserve special
attention to the problem of setting the fee at the end of this
section.
OTT - minimize the costs to serve the demand
We now focus on the deployment decision problem from
the point of view of the OTTs. We assume that each OTT
knows the characteristics of its own demand, expressed
as τ(cˆ, u), where cˆ is the content type that belongs to the
OTT considered. The OTT can choose between serving the
demand directly, deploying its own infrastructure, or using
the MNO’s infrastructure and paying the fee β. We assume
that the β fee at this stage is known. Each OTT wants
to maximize its profit, which is in this case equivalent to
minimizing the total cost, i.e.,
min
xOTT,yOTT
(
β
∑
u∈U
τ¯ (cˆ, u) +
∑
t∈TOTT
∑
l∈Lt
yOTT(l, t)p(l, t)
)
(3)
∑
t∈TOTT
∑
l∈Lt
xOTT(cˆ, l, t, u)k(l, t, u) ≤ τ(cˆ, u), ∀u ∈ U (4)
∑
u∈U
xOTT(cˆ, l, t, u) ≤ yOTT(l, t), ∀t ∈ TOTT, l ∈ Lt, (5)
where τ¯ is the residual demand, expressed as the dif-
ference between the total demand and the demand that is
served by the OTT’s base stations:
τ¯ (cˆ, u) = τ(cˆ, u)−
∑
t∈TOTT
∑
l∈Lt
xOTT(cˆ, l, t, u)k(l, t, u). (6)
The first term in Eq. (3) represents the fees paid to the
MNO to serve the residual demand. The second term is the
cost incurred by the OTT to deploy its own infrastructure.
The OTT has no constraints to serve all its demand itself
as indicated in Eq. (4): any residual demand τ¯ will be
served by the MNO, as described earlier, in exchange for
a fee. Moreover, constraint Eq. (4) indicates that the OTT
does not serve more traffic demand then it has to, thus it
prevents the quantity τ¯ (cˆ, u) from taking negative values.
Eq. (5) ensures that we properly account for the maximum
capacity of the base stations. If the yOTT-value is zero, Eq. (5)
indicates that the base station cannot serve any user at all. If
it is one, it prevents base stations from serving more traffic
than they can, i.e., more than their capacity. The OTT is
concerned with minimizing its total cost expressed in Eq. (3);
if building no base station at all serves such a purpose, there
is nothing forcing OTTs to do otherwise.
It is worth observing that the residual demand τ¯ is a
decision variable for the OTTs, and, after we obtain the τ¯ for
all the content types c ∈ C, it becomes an input parameter
in the MNO deployment problem we examine in the next
section.
MNO - minimize the deployment costs
At this stage, the MNO obtains the residual demand τ¯ (c, u)
for each user cluster and content type, i.e., the demand that
the OTTs decided to have served by the MNO, in exchange
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for the fee β. The MNO has to deploy infrastructure, i.e.,
setting yMNO-values to one, in order to serve the residual
demand. It seeks to satisfy the demandwith minimum costs:
min
xMNO,yMNO
∑
t∈TMNO
∑
l∈Lt
yMNO(l, t)p(l, t). (7)
∑
t∈TMNO
∑
l∈Lt
xMNO(c, l, t, u)k(l, t, u) ≥ τ¯ (c, u), ∀c ∈ C, u ∈ U
(8)∑
u∈U
∑
c∈C
xMNO(c, l, t, u) ≤ yMNO(l, t), ∀t ∈ TMNO, l ∈ Lt.
(9)
Eq. (7) has to satisfy the constraints on the traffic de-
mand and on the capacity expressed by Eq. (8) and Eq. (9).
The constraint expressed by Eq. (8) ensures that the MNO
provides enough capacity for all user clusters u ∈ U and
contents c ∈ C the MNO must serve, while the constraint in
Eq. (9) ensures that we properly account for the maximum
capacity of the base stations and that only active base
stations are used.
We note that the fee β does not appear in the MNO
deployment problem – as at this stage, the MNO has already
established the fee, and has to serve all the demand the OTT
decides to delegate to it.
MNO - maximize the revenue by setting the fee β
Setting the fee is the most complex task. It is a decision made
by the MNO that depends on the response of the OTTs. The
objective of the MNO is maximizing its own profit as shown
in the following formula:
max
β
(
β
∑
u∈U
∑
c∈C
τ¯ (c, u)−
∑
t∈TMNO
∑
l∈Lt
yMNO(l, t)p(l, t)
)
(10)
The objective function expressed in Eq. (10) is composed
by two terms. The first indicates the revenue that the MNO
collects by serving the residual demand for each content
type that belongs to the OTTs. The second term is the cost
incurred in by the MNO to deploy additional infrastructure
to serve the residual demand. The residual demand appears
twice in this optimization problem, explicitly in the objective
function in the first term, and implicitly in the second term
in the form of the constraint in Eq. (8).
The residual demand τ¯(c, u) depends upon decisions
made by the OTTs that are affected by the fee β, as we have
seen previously. It is clear at this stage that the problem
of optimizing the fees by the MNO is entwined with the
problem faced by the OTTs to minimize their own costs. To
circumvent this issue, we depict a strategy that we illustrate
in Fig. 3.
At first, the MNO observes the traffic demand and infers
the characteristics of the demand. The MNO then tries to
optimize the fees by evaluating its utility function expressed
in Eq. (10) for several values of β and then selecting the best
one. The MNO essentially has to solve a univariate discrete
optimization problem that now involves an iterative pro-
cess. The MNO estimates the residual demand left unserved
Content demand
estimation
Setting the fees
Estimate the
residual demand
and 
own deployment
Optimizing
the fees
Optimal
fees
Fig. 3: Strategy to set the optimal fees from the MNO
perspective. The MNO has to estimate the action of each
OTT, assuming they seek to minimize their own cost.
by each OTT and subsequently the new infrastructure neces-
sary to serve the whole residual demand for each value of β
by sequentially solving both the OTT’s deployment problem
and its own.
Each fee’s configuration in fact yields a different residual
demand τ¯ . However, the final network deployment corre-
sponds to the one resulting from the optimum β from the
perspective of the MNO.
3.3 Solution strategy
In the following, we discuss how each of the problems
presented above can be solved.
The OTTs and MNO deployments, corresponding to the
internal boxes in Fig. 4, have the same structure. They are
linear problems with integer (binary) and real variables,
so they belong to the mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) class; they can be solved to optimality with branch-
and-cut algorithms using commercial state-of-the-art solvers
such as Gurobi or CPLEX, provided that the size of the
problem is not too large. If the size of the problem is too
large, we would face the well-known scalability issues of
MILP problems. In this case, we would turn to heuristic
solutions such as the ones described in [12], originally for-
mulated for set-covering problems. Their greedy approach
has been shown, through extensive studies carried out on
the OR problem library [13], to consistently perform close
to the optimum, with a ratio between the solution they find
and the optimal one being typically around 1.2.
The problem solved by the MNO when setting the fee β
is even more challenging, lacking a closed-form expression.
However, in light of our strategy described in Fig. 3, the new
problem becomes a univariate problem in β, and therefore
can be solved heuristically with root-finding algorithms
such as the Brent method [14].
Root-finding algorithms explore several possible values
of the decision variable, evaluate the value of the objective
function, and use such information to select the next values
to try. In our case, each iteration of the Brent method solves
the problems Eq. (3) and Eq. (7) in sequence; their outputs
are used to compute the payoff Eq. (10) and to find the
optimal value of β.
If we decide that spectral efficiency values η also need
to account for interference from new deployments, they
would need to be recomputed at every iteration of the
Brent method, as they would depend upon decisions made
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therein.2 Also notice that in practice, when deploying addi-
tional infrastructure, MNOs and OTTs can account for the
resulting change in the interference environment through
frequency planning and power control.
The scalability of the overall solution concept is ensured
by the fact that the Brent method requires a limited number
of iterations to converge, and each iteration takes a limited
amount of time to solve subproblems Eq. (3) and Eq. (7).
Although they have been consistently observed to per-
form very well in practice, neither the Brent method nor
the heuristic in [12] come with a formal, absolute optimality
guarantee. This is indeed consistent with our goals: we seek
to confirm and uncover correlations between the conditions
under which service-driven networks will operate and the
features they will exhibit; to this end, heuristic solutions are
essentially as useful as optimal ones.
Another relevant feature of our solution strategy is
that it uses off-the-shelf components whenever available,
either commercial solvers like CPLEX and Gurobi or well-
established software like MATLAB and NumPy. Doing so
allows us to focus on the solution strategy and the results
it yields, as opposed to fine-tuning its building blocks.
Furthermore, it provides us with the efficiency we need to
process our datasets.
4 FACTORS SHAPING SERVICE-DRIVEN MOBILE
NETWORKS
In this section, we describe the factors that will drive and
shape service-driven mobile networks: the availability of
new types of base stations; the fungibility of different por-
tions of the spectrum; the regulatory decisions constraining
the deployment of network infrastructure; the demand it
will need to serve.
For each of these elements, we explain how it is captured
within the model described in Sec. 2. We then review the es-
timates for its value existing in the literature, and determine
either a value or a range of values to use in our performance
evaluation.
4.1 Base station technologies
Heterogeneity will be an important feature of service-driven
mobile networks. Different types of base stations will coexist
therein, including:
• LTE macro-base stations (macroBSs);
• LTE micro-base stations (microBSs);
• millimeter-wave base stations (mmWave);
• Wi-Fi access points.
Additional types of base stations can be added to T
as sufficiently detailed information about them becomes
available such as Google’s Project Loon [15], LTE balloon-
powered platforms operating in unlicensed bands used to
provide LTE coverage to rural areas, or Facebook’s Connec-
tivity Project [?].
Infrastructure types that operate in licensed bands
(hence with exclusive usage rights) can only be deployed
2. Refreshing the η-values would marginally improve the accuracy of
the results yielded by this model, at the cost of a substantially higher
computational complexity. For this reason, we leave η-values constant
for our performance evaluation (Sec. 6).
by mobile network operators (e.g., LTE macroBSs and LTE
microBSs at 1.8GHz and 2.6GHz), while technologies oper-
ating in shared bands can be deployed by both MNO and
OTT (e.g., mmWave, LTE microBSs at 3.5GHz, Wi-Fi) having
different costs and fungibility (see Sec. 4.2).
Tab. 1 summarizes the types of infrastructure we con-
sider in this study, i.e., the elements of set T . For each of
them, we indicate the frequency they operate at, their band-
width, their maximum spectral efficiency, and the resulting
maximum capacity – this is an upper bound on the values
of parameter k(l, t, u). Notice that microBSs with exclusive
and opportunistic access are considered as two separate
elements of T .
4.1.1 Cost
Estimating the cost of a base station is a difficult exercise.
We gathered the figures indicated in Tab. 1 from peer-
reviewed publications where available, and falling back
to other sources such as business/technical reports when
needed. Despite extensive research, we were unable to find
a single cost estimate for mmWave base stations, other than
generic claims that they will be inexpensive. We conjecture
that their cost will lie between the most expensive Wi-Fi
access points and the cheapest microBSs.
Recall that, as mentioned in Sec. 2, our costs p(l, t) are
per-year. It follows that the values in Tab. 1 include both
one-time costs (e.g., infrastructure) and recurring costs (e.g.,
energy or rent). Also, note that, for simplicity, we assume
the price for each base station of technology t ∈ T to be the
same regardless of the location l ∈ Lt.
4.1.2 Performance
Our system model (Sec. 2) includes a parameter η(l, t, u) ≤
ηmax(t) describing the actual spectral efficiency attained by
a base station of technology t deployed at location l when
serving users in cluster u. The main factors influencing η-
values are path-loss and interference, which we estimate
through ITU- and 3GPP-vetted propagation models [22],
[23].
Fig. 5 shows the distribution of the η(l,t,u)
ηmax(t)
ratio for
the different technologies, throughout all the experiments
we run in our analysis. We can observe that technologies
operating on licensed frequencies, e.g., macroBSs, tend to
have a better ratio – even though the median macroBS has a
spectral efficiency that barely exceeds 2 bps/Hz. mmWave
and Wi-Fi never go beyond 50% and 70% of their potential
efficiency.
4.2 Spectrum fungibility
Fungibility as a concept has roots in the economic process
of trade. The core of this concept is the ability to substitute
one item with another, without altering any other aspect
of a trade. As such, this concept implies two distinct roles,
a buyer and a seller, with the former having the power to
declare items fungible. In terms of spectrum, the buyer may
be a network operator and the seller may be a regulatory
agency, which offers usage of a particular set of frequen-
cies. Two bands of spectrum are considered fungible if the
operator is happy to obtain either one at a given time and
price.
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TABLE 1: Infrastructure types populating set T .
Base station
Frequency
Bandwidth Max. spectral Max.
Tx power Cost range
Approx.
technology B(t) efficiency ηmax(t) capacity range
LTE macroBS
1.8 GHz
20 MHz
4.4 bps/Hz
88 Mbps 40 dBm
[10000,60000] Several hundreds
(licensed) [16] e/year [17], [18] of meters
LTE microBS-L
2.6 GHz
20 MHz
4.4 bps/Hz
88 Mbps 33 dBm
[2000,10000] Few hundreds
(licensed) [16] e/year [17], [18] of meters
LTE microBS-S
3.5 GHz
20 MHz
4.4 bps/Hz <88 Mbps
33 dBm
[2000,10000] Few hundreds
(shared) [16] (fungibility<1) e/year [17], [18] of meters
mmWave 73 GHz
500 MHz
2.25 bps/Hz <1125 Mbps
30 dBm
[1000,2000] Tens of
[19], [20] (shared) (fungibility<1) e/year meters
Wi-Fi
2.4,5 GHz
20 MHz
3.12 bps/Hz <62.4 Mbps
24 dBm
1000 Tens of
(shared) [21] (fungibility<1) e/year [17], [18] meters
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
η/ηmax
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
macroBS
microBS
Wi-Fi
mmWaves
Fig. 5: Distribution of the ratio between the actual spectral
efficiency values η(l, t, u) and the corresponding upper-
bounds ηmax(t), for different technologies.
As spectrum usage becomes more fluid, the concept of
fungibility of spectrum becomes increasingly important [8].
Network operators have the ability to divert traffic between
a number of different bands and technologies, buying this
capacity on demand; fungibility provides an important tool
to assess the relative usefulness of these options based on
the goals of the operator.
Different portions of spectrum are not fungible, for three
reasons:
• different frequencies are associated with different
bitrate and coverage;
• different frequencies typically require different hard-
ware running different protocols;
• unlicensed frequency bands are more prone to con-
gestion and interference than licensed ones.
From the point of view of our model, all three aspects
above are embedded in the fungibility parameter f(t)which
we use to estimate the capacity k(l, t, u), as discussed in
Sec. 4.1. Fungibility is a coefficient by which we further
multiply the capacity as listed in Tab. 1; its values are
presented in Tab. 2.
TABLE 2: Fungibility coefficients.
Technology
Fungibility f(t)
Source
range
Small cells
.6− .9 [24]
(WiFi and mmWave)
MicroBSs
.5− .75 [25]
(in shared bands)
4.3 Regulatory decisions
Licensed spectrum is a scarce resource. Hence, who will be
allowed to use it, and how, have a critical impact on network
performance, and heavily depend on regulatory decisions.
In our work, we examine two scenarios concerning which
portions of the spectrum, and under which conditions, OTTs
have access to:
• LTE-standard complying base stations can only
transmit in licensed spectrum. OTTs cannot operate
microBSs in shared bands [Scenario A].
• LTE-standard complying base stations can be de-
ployed in both licensed and shared spectrum. The
OTT and MNO can deploy microBSs, but in shared
bands they experience a fungibility coefficient lower
than one, as reported in Tab. 2 [Scenario B].
Selecting one or the other of these scenarios changes the
elements of set TOTT, as well as the adjusted capacity k of
base stations.
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4.4 Demand
The total demand and set C of content types depend on
the reference scenario we consider, as discussed later in
Sec. 5. We seek to study the impact that spatial clustering
of intensities for a particular content, i.e., whether users
requesting a particular content tend to be close to each other
or not, has on service-driven networks. We quantify this
clustering through the Hegyi index [26], used to express
the clustering strength between spatially distributed points
(user clusters, in our case) associated to a continuous value
(contents, in our case). The Hegyi index for user cluster u
and content c is:
H(c, u) =
N∑
i=1
τ(c, u)
τ(c, u)(1 + ||u + ni(u)||)
, (11)
where || · || denotes the Euclidean distance between two user
clusters, ni(u) denotes the i-th closest cluster to u, and N is
a parameter denoting the number of nearest user clusters we
account for (in our case,N = 5). The complementarity value
associated with a specific content type c′ ∈ C is defined as
the average over all user clusters u ∈ U of H(c′, u):
H(c′) =
1
|U|
∑
u∈U
H(c′, u). (12)
The complementarity value defined in Eq. (12) ulti-
mately tells us how spatially-clustered the demand for a
certain content type tends to be. Intuitively, we can expect
that a more clustered demand is easier to serve through
such targeted infrastructure as the one that can be deployed
by OTTs. Location-specific services, e.g., tourist informa-
tion [27] or advertisements for local businesses [28], are
often mentioned as prime examples of content associated to
high complementarity values. Other such contents include
maps, especially for mobile and vehicular users [29], and,
more recently, augmented-reality games such as Pokemon
Go [30].
We investigate the correlation between the complemen-
tarity of the demand for a particular content with the
traits of the resulting network in Sec. 6. Notice that we do
not assume a certain complementarity value for our study;
rather, we explore what happens if high-complementarity,
location-based services come to pass.
5 REFERENCE SCENARIO
In this section, we describe the reference scenario we employ
for our simulations, i.e., how we populate the sets of user
clusters U and (potential) base station locations Lt for each
technology t ∈ T , and how we set the demand τ(c, u) for
each user cluster and content type.
User clusters and locations: our reference topology is
the entire urban area of Dublin, Ireland, as indicated by the
Central Statistics Office (CSO) Ireland in [31]. We place a
total of 2, 210 user clusters throughout this area, such that
each cluster represents a population of at most 300 people.
It follows that more populated areas tend to have more
user clusters; this enables us to study dense deployments
in such areas while keeping the overall complexity low. We
also assume that the LTE macroBSs deployment is already
in place to ensure full coverage and mobility and it is given
by the available on-line data [32]. In fact, it makes sense for
the MNOs to consider in network planning problems the
infrastructure already deployed, especially the costly one.
The possible locations in Lt for technology t ∈ T
are placed on a regular grid with the inter-site distance
depending on the coverage range. For example, the inter-
site distance for LTE microBS is 100 meters, while for WiFi
and mmWave is 50 meters.
Service providers demand and initial deployment:
setting the demand values τ(c, u) is a complex task, for
which little information is available and some speculation
is unavoidable. We proceed as follows:
1) we set the total demand for each user cluster u, i.e.,∑
c∈C
τ(c, u);
2) we decide how this total demand is split between
contents;
3) we adjust the resulting demand complementarity.
We accomplish the first step by leveraging a set of real-
world call-detail record (CDR) information from an Irish
mobile operator, referring to a period of two weeks in
2013. We then augment that total demand according to the
projections of the Cisco Virtual Network Index [33], and
obtain an estimate for mobile data demand over the next
5 years.
Breaking down such an aggregated demand into indi-
vidual demand for each content is another complex prob-
lem.We turn to the measurementwork [34], which identifies
four traffic patterns, i.e., sets of content types, that users in
each location were found to conform to. We assume then
that a particular content type can be associated with an OTT.
We randomly associate one traffic profile to each user
cluster, adjusting the average distance between two user
clusters belonging to the same profile. Intuitively, a small
distance means that users wanting the same content types
tend to be located close together, hence a higher comple-
mentarity as defined in Eq. (12).
Finally, we select the most popular of contents types
as cˆ ∈ C, i.e., the demand volume that the OTT has to serve
(either through the MNO’s network or its own). All other
content types are assumed to belong to the MNO.
6 RESULTS
In this section we analyze the relationship between the
parameters of our model and the resulting base station
deployments. Intuitively, we try different combinations of
input parameters (the yellow boxes in Fig. 1, e.g., different
levels of cost for macroBSs), and observe how and how much
they impact the resulting network deployment (the blue
boxes in Fig. 1, e.g., how many base stations are deployed
and by whom).
As summarized in Fig. 6, we split our analysis into two
parts. First, in Sec. 6.1, we seek to understand which input
parameters have the deepest influence on the fee β⋆ that
the MNO will charge to the OTT for using its network;
then, in Sec. 6.2, we assess how β⋆ influences the network
deployment.
We focus on β⋆ because this quantity represents the way
the two actors we study, namely, MNO and OTT, interact
with each other. Doing so also allows us to simplify the
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Fig. 7: Distribution of the fee β⋆ for low (a), medium (b), high (c) complementarity. Bars represent the fraction of β⋆ values
that are low, medium, high.
network of relationships shown in Fig. 1 and study, in its
stead, only those involving β⋆ itself.
6.1 What determines β⋆?
The first part of the analysis, as indicated in Fig. 6(a), seeks
to assess the key determinants on the variations of β⋆. We
carry out a sensitivity analysis employing a multivariable
ordinary least-squared (OLS) regression model, where the
independent variables are all the ones on the left hand side
of Fig. 1 and the dependent variable is β⋆. The total number
of parameter combinations we study is 720.
The results of the regression model are summarized in
Tab. 3. As per Fig. 6(a), in this part of our analysis β⋆ is
the dependent variable and all other quantities – regula-
tor decisions, demand complementarity, costs, fungibility
values – are independent variables. We can immediately
notice that among the input parameters chosen to analyse
β⋆, only three are actually statistically significant at a p-
value of .01. First, both the regulator and the cost of LTE
microBSs have a negative impact on the fee charged by
the MNO. The (binary)3 variable modelling the regulator
allows the OTT access to deploy LTE microBSs in shared
spectrum. Infrastructures with wider coverage appear to
be very appealing to OTTs since they allow the OTTs to
3. We remark that, while OLS analysis for generic categorical vari-
ables requires such special techniques as dummy variables or one-hot
encoding, binary independent variables can be used as they are.
serve lower-demand subscribers with less infrastructure. As
a consequence, the MNO tries to discourage the OTT from
deploying many LTEmicroBS by setting a lower price on the
OTT traffic it can serve. Second, the demand complemen-
tarity has a non-obvious positive impact on the β⋆. When
the majority of the demand is clustered, it can be served
with fewer base stations. As a result, the MNO’s best action
is to set a high fee so as to ensure some gain at least in
those regions where the OTT does not find it convenient to
deploy any infrastructure. This dual effect is also captured
by the histograms in Fig. 7. Preventing OTTs from deploying
microBSs, i.e., moving from scenario B to scenario A as
defined in Sec. 4.3, generally yields fewer values in the lower
bins and more in the higher ones, i.e., increasing the fee –
intuitively, reducing the freedom of action of OTTs increases
the fee they are required to pay.
For completeness, we also report in Tab. 3 the coefficient
of determination, R2. It measures how well the model
captures the variation of the dependent variable [35] and
it is defined as:
R2 = 1−
∑
i(si − s¯)
2∑
i(si − fi)
2
, (13)
where si and s¯ are the sample value and the sample mean
respectively, and fi is the modeled/fitted value.
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TABLE 3: Standardized regression analysis coefficients, rel-
ative to the first part of our analysis (Fig. 6(a)), where β⋆
is the dependent variable and the quantities listed in the
first column are independent variables. The coefficent of
determination is R2 = .60. (see Fig. 6(a)).
Independent
coef.* p-val.** std. error
variables
Regulator −.55 ✓ .03
Demand
.28 ✓ .02
complementarity
Cost
−.00 ✗ .09
(mmwave)
Cost
.40 ✓ .04
(micro LTE)
Fungibility
.01 ✗ .10
(small cells)
Fungibility
.00 ✗ .12
(micro LTE (S))
* It represents the mean change in the dependent
variable for 1 unit change in the corresponding
independent variable while holding the other
independent variables to their mean.
** ✓ indicates statistical significance (p-value<
.01) while ✗ indicates not statistically significant
(p-value> .01).
6.2 What influences the deployment?
In the second part of the analysis, we focus on the network
deployment. We identify, for each operator (i.e., MNO and
OTT) and each technology (e.g. WiFi, mmWave, and LTE
micro BSs) three parameters of interest: amount of infras-
tructure built, the capacity supplied and the traffic served
by such infrastructure.
There are two main differences from the analysis in
Sec. 6.1: first, the β⋆ identified in Sec. 6.1 takes now a much
more important role. Together with the original input pa-
rameters, we investigate the impact of the β⋆ variable on the
deployment, in particular the decision the OTT of whether
or not to deploy infrastructure to serve its own demand.
To carry out this study we run multiple multivariable OLS
regressions, focusing on one outcome variable at a time.
In Tab. 4 we summarize the results obtained by check-
ing one dependent variable at a time. Tab. 4 should be
read row-wise, where each row reports the coefficients and
p-value of an individual multivariable regression model
on the corresponding network deployment output. Tab. 4
lists network deployment quantities (i.e., number of base
stations, capacity, traffic served, and level of clustering)
grouped by operators and technology in the first column.
Remaining columns represent independent variables (i.e.,
β⋆, regulatory decisions, demand characteristics, technolo-
gies cost, fungibility), with the final column reporting the
R2 value.
A few observations are noteworthy. First, only the cost
for LTE microBSs is significant to all network planning
actions. Second, the upper part of Tab. 4 reveals that, for
the OTT, the β⋆ and the regulatory decisions are influential
parameters. They affect all the deployment decisions taken
by the OTT, and, to a different extent, the MNO, i.e., defining
the heterogeneity of the number of base stations and capac-
ity deployed. The demand complementarity mainly impacts
the planning decisions of the OTT, while the decisions taken
by the MNO are mostly driven by infrastructure cost.
6.2.1 Infrastructure cost
As we have seen in Tab. 4, infrastructure cost has a sig-
nificant influence on the deployment decisions made by
operators and service providers. In Fig. 8(a) we show the
number of base stations of each type deployed by the OTT
and the MNO. On the x-axis is the cost (relative to the WiFi)
to deploy andmaintain a mmWave or an LTEmicroBS. OTTs
are allowed to deploy LTE microBSs in opportunistic access
spectrum, i.e., we are in scenario B as described in Sec. 4.3.
Let us compare the group of bars on the left hand side of
Fig. 8(a), indicating low costs for infrastructure, with the
group of bars in the middle and the right hand side of
Fig. 8(a) indicating medium and high costs respectively: if
infrastructure is sufficiently cheap, the best course of action
for the MNO and OTT is to rely more on LTE microBSs, the
ones that give the best compromise between coverage and
capacity. As the infrastructure cost increases, both MNO and
OTT rely more on WiFi infrastructure. Fig. 8(b) shows how
the capacity evolves according to changes in the costs. High-
capacity/short-range technologies will only be successful
if their cost is low enough; otherwise, due to their low
coverage range, they are unlikely to be deployed. Fig. 8(b)
and Fig. 8(c) display an interesting effect: higher capacity
does not necessarily translate into more traffic being served
if the capacity is very localized, as it is the case with short-
range infrastructure. In fact, as the cost of infrastructure
increases, the OTT relies more on the MNO to serve its
demand, as it again can be observed in Fig. 8(c).
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 provide a closer look at how the combi-
nation of prices for microBSs and mmWave influence the de-
cisions made by the OTT and MNO. Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 10(a)
show that OTTs essentially choose between microBSs and
Wi-Fi access points, while they resort to mmWave base sta-
tions only when their cost is low. Consistently with Fig. 8(b),
Fig. 9(b) and Fig. 10(b) show that mmWave base stations
skew the network capacity, even when, as we can see in
Fig. 8(c), Fig. 9(c) and Fig. 10(c), microBSs serve most of the
traffic.
Service-driven networks will be different from current
ones in that the network technology providing the most
capacity may not be the one serving the most traffic. This
leaves room for innovative applications e.g., proximity ser-
vices and machine-to-machine systems – as long as they do
not require ubiquitous, continuous coverage.
6.2.2 Demand complementarity
As seen in Sec. 6.1 and in particular in Fig. 7, the demand
complementarity has a non-negligible impact on the fee β⋆
that the MNO charges the OTT to carry its traffic, i.e. the β
value that maximizes the quantity in Eq. (10).
Complementarity also affects the extent to which the
network deployments of the MNO and, especially, of the
OTT follow the demand. Fig. 11 refers to the scenario with
medium infrastructure prices and high complementarity. We
can see from Fig. 11(a) that the demand for content cˆ tends
to be clustered. Fig. 11(b), showing the capacity deployed by
the OTT, clearly follows the same pattern – the OTT deploys
more capacity where it has more demand. The first thing we
can observe by looking at Fig. 11(c), depicting the capacity
deployed by the MNO, is that it does not clearly follow the
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TABLE 4: Standardized regression analysis coefficients, p-values and R2 for the system in Fig. 6(b).
Dep.
Ind. β⋆ Regulator
Demand Cost Cost Fungibility Fungibility
R
2complementarity (mmWave) (micro LTE) (small cells) (micro LTE (S))
coef.* p-val.** coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
# bs .51 ✓ −.51 ✓ −.25 ✓ .09 ✓ .14 ✓ −.01 ✗ −.01 ✗ .90
capacity .46 ✓ −.48 ✓ −.23 ✓ .13 ✓ .13 ✓ .31 ✓ −.01 ✗ .87
traffic .48 ✓ −.48 ✓ −.33 ✓ .09 ✓ .18 ✓ −.02 ✗ −.05 ✓ .87W
iF
i
clustering .54 ✓ −.38 ✓ −.15 ✓ .04 ✓ .25 ✓ −.00 ✗ −.02 ✗ .83
# bs .23 ✓ −.01 ✗ −.14 ✓ −.71 ✓ .06 ✓ .04 ✓ −.00 ✗ .75
capacity .22 ✓ −.03 ✗ −.12 ✓ −.67 ✓ .05 ✓ .16 ✓ −.15 ✓ .71
traffic .21 ✓ −.01 ✗ −.15 ✓ −.72 ✓ .07 ✓ .02 ✗ −.01 ✗ .76
m
m
W
av
e
clustering .13 ✓ −.02 ✗ .04 ✗ .31 ✓ .07 ✓ .14 ✗ −.02 ✗ .20
# bs −.23 ✓ .56 ✓ .11 ✓ −.01 ✗ −.34 ✓ .01 ✗ −.02 ✗ .69
capacity −.23 ✓ .55 ✓ .11 ✓ −.02 ✗ −.33 ✓ .01 ✗ .11 ✓ .70
traffic −.23 ✓ .62 ✓ .08 ✓ −.01 ✗ −.29 ✓ .01 ✗ .03 ✗ .81
O
T
T
m
ic
ro
L
T
E
clustering −.25 ✓ .37 ✓ .01 ✗ −.01 ✗ −.32 ✓ .00 ✗ −.10 ✓ .51
# bs −.05 ✓ −.78 ✓ .02 ✓ .10 ✓ .62 ✓ .00 ✗ −.05 ✓ .97
capacity −.06 ✓ −.72 ✓ .02 ✓ .12 ✓ .57 ✓ .34 ✓ −.06 ✓ .94
traffic .08 ✓ −.64 ✓ .05 ✓ .09 ✓ .73 ✓ .02 ✓ −.07 ✓ .96W
iF
i
clustering .57 ✓ −.26 ✓ −.15 ✓ .05 ✓ .30 ✓ −.00 ✗ −.02 ✗ .78
# bs .01 ✗ −.21 ✓ .01 ✗ −.72 ✓ .20 ✓ −.00 ✗ −.01 ✗ .80
capacity .02 ✗ −.20 ✓ .00 ✗ −.71 ✓ .19 ✓ .11 ✓ −.01 ✗ .78
traffic .04 ✗ −.13 ✓ −.00 ✗ −.74 ✓ .20 ✓ .00 ✗ −.02 ✗ .82
m
m
W
av
e
clustering −.14 ✓ −.38 ✓ .03 ✗ −.43 ✓ .29 ✓ .01 ✗ .00 ✗ .44
# bs −.07 ✓ .87 ✓ .01 ✓ −.00 ✗ −.37 ✓ −.00 ✗ −.02 ✓ .98
capacity .05 ✓ .86 ✓ −.00 ✗ −.00 ✗ −.47 ✓ −.06 ✓ .10 ✓ .96
traffic −.03 ✓ .89 ✓ .01 ✓ .00 ✗ −.40 ✓ −.02 ✓ .04 ✓ .98
M
N
O
m
ic
ro
L
T
E
clustering .13 ✓ .71 ✓ −.01 ✗ .01 ✗ −.61 ✓ −.02 ✗ −.01 ✗ .73
* It represents the mean change in the dependent variable for 1 unit of change in the corresponding independent variable while holding the others.
**
✓ indicates statistical significance (p-value< .01) while ✗ indicates not statistically significant (p-value> .01).
*** We omit the standard error and the 95% confidence interval in order to keep the table more readable.
**** The colors are consistent with Fig. 8, Fig. 9, and Fig. 10 in order to help the reader to follow the discussion.
LL MM HH
Infrastructure costs
0
100
200
300
400
500
#
 b
a
se
 s
ta
ti
o
n
s
MNO Wi-Fi
MNO mmWave
MNO microBSs (L+S)
OTT Wi-Fi
OTT mmWaves
OTT microBSs (S)
(a)
LL MM HH
Infrastructure costs
0
5
10
15
20
25
C
a
p
a
ci
ty
 [
G
b
it
/s
e
c]
MNO Wi-Fi
MNO mmWave
MNO microBSs (L+S)
OTT Wi-Fi
OTT mmWaves
OTT microBSs (S)
(b)
LL MM HH
Infrastructure costs
0
1
2
3
4
5
Tr
a
ff
ic
 s
e
rv
e
d
 [
G
b
it
/s
e
c]
MNO Wi-Fi
MNO mmWave
MNO microBSs (L+S)
OTT Wi-Fi
OTT mmWaves
OTT microBSs (S)
(c)
Fig. 8: Number of base stations deployed (a), capacity supplied (b), traffic served (c) for different combinations of prices.
The error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.
demand of content cˆ. Instead the capacity deployed in the
reference scenario complements the one deployed by the
MNO rather than overlapping with it.
When we lower the complementarity to its minimum
value, in Fig. 12, an entirely different picture emerges. The
demand for content cˆ (Fig. 12(a)) is distributed over a wider
area, mostly in the South. As we can see from Fig. 12(b), the
OTT deploys a much lower number of base stations, in lo-
cations throughout the topology. Also notice from Fig. 12(c)
how some of the demand for content cˆ is also served by the
MNO.
In summary, Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, obtained for different
values of complementarity, show two very different net-
works. In Fig. 11, OTT and MNO complement each other
in serving the traffic demand; in Fig. 12 the MNO builds a
high-capacity network with vast coverage and the OTT pays
a (moderate) fee to use it.
7 RELATED WORK
A first body of works our paper relates to deals with
the planning of mobile networks. Particular emphasis is
put on their different conditions and requirements with
respect to traditional LTE networks, including radically
different outdoor and indoor scenarios [36], ultra-dense de-
ployments [37], and device-to-device communications [38].
Much attention has been devoted to new physical-layer
technology that, on the one hand, will enable future net-
works to serve their increased data demand and, on the
other hand, will call for new architectures and management
strategies. Prominent examples include massive MIMO and
millimeter waves [39]. Especially interesting from our view-
point are the studies that try to quantify the capacity offered
by such base stations, including [19], [20], and their cost,
e.g., [17], [18]. Cost information is generally scarce, and
more easily found in business reports [17] than in peer-
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Fig. 9: MNO. Number of base stations deployed (a), capacity supplied (b), traffic served (c) for all costs combinations.
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Fig. 11: High complementarity: location of the demand for content type cˆ (a); capacity deployed by the OTT (b) and the
MNO (c).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 12: Low complementarity: location of the demand for content type cˆ (a); capacity deployed by the OTT (b) and the
MNO (c).
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reviewed literature.
Fungibility studies are also very relevant to our work.
Examples include [8], which introduced several methods to
compute fungibility scores, and [40], where those scores are
refined. A set of related works aims at the more general
objective of assigning a value to wireless spectrum, for the
purpose of introducing fluid networks [41], and enabling
spectrum trading [42], [43]. The ultimate purpose is evalu-
ating the effectiveness of dynamic spectrum use, where [44]
specifically accounts for regulatory decisions.
Finally, our work is related to such real-world mea-
surements of data demand as [34], [45], [46]. Two of these
reports show that different types of data demand tend to be
spatially correlated [45], [46]. These studies were concerned
with web services and smartphone apps only; however,
similar conclusions were drawn when more general mobile
demand was considered, as in [34], where the authors
operated on flow-level information sent to and from cellular
devices. Their study reveals that various data applications
are not equally popular across all cells, and that “the pop-
ularity of some applications is more skewed than others
across cells”. Moreover, a few applications dominate others
given their relative traffic volume, and applications can be
grouped into traffic profiles that describe application usage
distribution for any given cell. Other works, e.g., [47], [48]
have studied real-world deployments of cellular networks,
and found that some spacial features thereof are remarkably
similar throughout mobile operators and cities.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper sought to study the mobile network expansion
driven by the OTT’s service needs and to assess, first, the
factors that are likely to impact deployment decisions by
OTTs and MNOs, and second, the characteristics of the
resulting networks.
We found that the factors with the deepest influence
on the final network are not technical but rather economic
(e.g., the cost of base stations) and regulatory (e.g., the
type of spectrum and technologies OTTs are allowed to
use). Different combinations of these factors yield radically
different networks: in some cases, OTTs and MNOs deploy
separate networks that complement each other; in others,
MNOs find it convenient to offer plentiful, cheap capacity
to OTTs, which have no incentive to deploy their own
networks. Furthermore, the technologies providing most
of the network capacity (most notably, mmWave) will not
serve most of the traffic, leaving plenty of opportunities
for innovative applications such as proximity services and
M2M.
Real-world datasets such as ours are difficult to come by,
and one might wonder how general our conclusions based
on Dublin city are. While a definite answer would require
more datasets, the authors of [48] found that base station
deployments of different operators in different cities have
remarkably similar spatial properties and can be modeled
with very similar statistic models. This, along with the
fact that we study different demand profiles with different
complementarity values, affords to our study a high level
of generality. Indeed, our conclusions about the importance
of MNO fees are consistent with the findings of [49], which
uses stochastic distributions for both demand and infras-
tructure.
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